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Abstract
As the new technologies recently became widespread, enormous amount of data started to be
generated in very high speeds and stored in untrusted servers. The big data concept covers not
only the exceptional size of the datasets, but also high data generation rate and large variety
of data types. Although the Big Data provides very tempting benefits, the security issues are
still an open problem.
In this thesis, we identify security and privacy problems associated with a certain big data
application, namely secure keyword-based search over encrypted cloud data and emphasize
the actual challenges and technical difficulties in the big data setting. More specifically, we
provide definitions from which privacy requirements can be derived. In addition, we adapt
an existing work on privacy-preserving keyword-based search method, which is one of the
fundamental operations that can be performed over encrypted data, to the big data setting, in
which, not only data is huge but also changing and accumulating very fast. Therefore, in the
v
big data setting, a secure index that allows search over encrypted data should be constructed
and updated very fast in addition to an efficient and effective keyword-based search operation
method.
Our proposal is scalable in the sense that it can leverage distributed file systems and
parallel programming techniques such as the Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) and
the MapReduce programming model to work with very large datasets. We also propose a
lazy idf-updating method that can efficiently handle the relevancy scores of the documents in
dynamically changing and large datasets. We empirically show the efficiency and accuracy
of the method through extensive set of experiments on real data.
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O¨zet
Son zamanlarda, yeni teknolojilerin daha yaygın hale gelmesiyle, c¸ok bu¨yu¨k miktarda
veri c¸ok hızlı bir s¸ekilde u¨retilmeye ve gu¨venilir olmayan sunucularda depolanmaya bas¸landı.
Bu¨yu¨k veri kavramı sadece veri ku¨mesinin olag˘anu¨stu¨ boyutunu deg˘il, aynı zamanda yu¨ksek
veri olus¸um hızını ve verilerin c¸ok c¸es¸itli tu¨rlerde oldug¸unu vurgulamak ic¸in kullanılır. Bu¨yu¨k
veri, c¸ok cazip avantajlar sag˘lasa da, gu¨venlik sorunları hala ac¸ık olan bir problemdir.
Bu tezde, belli bir bu¨yu¨k veri uygulaması ile ilis¸kili gu¨venlik ve mahremiyet sorunlarını
adresliyoruz. Bir dig˘er deyis¸le, s¸ifreli bulut verisi u¨zerinde gu¨venli kelime-tabanlı arama
is¸leminin bu¨yu¨k veri ortamında zor oldug˘unu vurgulayıp, bunun o¨nu¨ndeki teknik zorlukları
belirtiyoruz. Daha o¨zel olarak ise, mahremiyet gereksinimlerinin tam olarak ortaya kon-
abilmesi ic¸in gerekli formal tanımları veriyoruz. Ayrıca, sadece devasa deg˘il aynı zamanda
deg˘is¸en ve c¸ok hızlı biriken bu¨yu¨k veri ortamı ic¸in, s¸ifreli veriler u¨zerinde uygulanabilir
vii
temel is¸lemlerden biri olan mahremiyet korumalı kelime arama is¸lemi u¨zerinde varolan bir
c¸alıs¸mayı uyarlıyoruz. Gelis¸tirilen c¸o¨zu¨mler, bu¨yu¨k veri ortamında, s¸ifreli veriler u¨zerinde
aramaya olanak veren gu¨venli bir endeks yapısını makul bir hız ile ins¸a edebilmeli, ayrıca
verimli ve etkili bir kelime arama is¸lemi yo¨ntemi ic¸in c¸ok hızlı gu¨ncelleyebilmelidir.
O¨nerdig˘imiz c¸o¨zu¨mlerin, c¸ok bu¨yu¨k veri ku¨meleri ile c¸alıs¸acak s¸ekilde o¨lc¸eklendirilebilmesi
ic¸in, Hadoop Dag˘ıtılmıs¸ Dosya Sistemi ( HDFS ) ve MapReduce programlama modeli gibi
paralel programlama teknikleri ve dag˘ıtık dosya sistemleri kullanılmaktadır. Dinamik olarak
deg˘is¸en, bu¨yu¨k veri ku¨mesindeki belgelerin ilgili puanlarını verimli is¸leyebilen bir tembel
idf gu¨ncelleme yo¨ntemini de o¨neriyoruz. Gerc¸ek veriler u¨zerinde gerc¸ekles¸tirdig˘imiz kap-
samlı deneyler vasıtasıyla o¨nerdig˘imiz yo¨ntemin etkinlig˘ini ve dog˘rulug˘unu deneysel olarak
go¨steriyoruz.
viii
to my beloved family...
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1 Introduction
With the widespread use of the Internet and wireless technologies in recent years, the sheer
volume of data being generated keeps increasing exponentially resulting in a sea of informa-
tion that has no end in sight. Although the Internet is considered as the main source of the
data, a considerable amount of data is also generated by other sources such as smart phones,
surveillance cameras or aircraft and their increasing use in everyday life. Utilizing these in-
formation sources, organizations collect terabytes and even petabytes of new data on a daily
bases. However, the collected data is useless unless it is possible to analyze and understand
the information within.
The emergence of massive datasets and their incessant expansion and proliferation led
to the term, big data. Accurate analysis and processing of big data, which bring about new
technological challenges as well as concerns in areas such as privacy and ethics, can pro-
vide exceptionally invaluable information to users, companies, institutions and in general to
public benefit [33]. The information harvested from big data has tremendous importance
since it provides benefits such as cost reduction, efficiency improvement, risk reduction, bet-
ter health care, and better decision making process. The technical challenges and difficulties
in effective and efficient analysis of massive amount of collected data call for new process-
ing methods [35, 36], leveraging the emergent parallel processing hardware and software
technologies.
Although the tremendous benefits of big data are enthusiastically welcomed, the privacy
issues still remain as a major concern. Most of the works in the literature unfortunately
prefer to disregard the privacy issues due to efficiency concerns since efficiency and privacy
protection are usually regarded as conflicting goals. This is true to a certain extent due to
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technical challenges, which however, should not deter the research to reconcile them in a
framework, which allows efficient privacy-preserving process of big data.
A fundamental operation in a dataset is to find data items containing certain piece of
information which is often manifested by a set of keywords in a query, namely keyword based
search. An important requirement of an effective search method over big data is the capability
of sorting the matching items according to their relevancy to the keywords in queries. An
efficient ranking method is particularly important in the big data setting, since the number of
matching data items may also be huge, if not filtered depending on their relevance levels.
In this thesis, we generalize the privacy-preserving search method that is proposed in [27]
and apply it in the big data setting. The method in [27], which is sequentially implemented,
is only capable of working with small datasets that contain only a few thousand documents.
In order to scale the method in [27] to massive datasets, we leverage the Hadoop frame-
work which is based on distributed file systems and parallel programming techniques. Using
Hadoop framework, we create our parallel processing environment, which is a multi-node
cluster and setup using the Cloudera framework (CDH4) [18]. For ordering the documents
based on their relevancy to a keyword search query, we use the well known tf-idf scoring
and adapt it to dynamic big data. In addition, we develop our MapReduce implementations
of the tf-idf algorithms proposed for Hadoop framework by Li and Guoyon in [24]. Unlike
the work in [27], we assume that the dataset is dynamic, which is an essential property of
big data. Therefore, we propose a method referred as “Lazy idf Update” which approximates
the relevancy scores using the existing information and only updates the inverse document
frequency (idf) value of documents when the change rate in the dataset exceeds a threshold.
Our analysis demonstrates that the proposed method is an efficient and highly scalable pri-
vacy preserving search method which takes advantage of the Hadoop Distributed File System
(HDFS) [20] and the MapReduce programming paradigm.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we briefly summarize the
previous work in the literature on secure search and Hadoop framework in detail. The pre-
liminary background information which is referred and needed throughout the thesis, such
as minhash functions [30] and the Hadoop structure, are given in Chapter 3. In this chapter,
we introduce the minhash functions known as locality sensitive hash functions (LSH) and
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signature structure in an explanatory manner. In addition, we give short information about
NoSQL. The details of distributed file systems and the Hadoop framework are given. We for-
malize the information that we protect in the protocol. We briefly summarize the underlying
secure search method of O¨rencik et al.[27]. We present the crucial steps of the tf-idf scoring
algorithms proposed by Li and Guoyong [24]. In Chapter 4, we present the framework of
the proposed model. The properties of big data and the new technologies developed to meet
the requirements of big data are summarized. The novel idf-updating method for adjusting
the tf-idf scoring for dynamically changing dataset is also explained in this chapter. In Chap-
ter 5, we discuss the results of the several experiments we applied on a large dataset using the
multi-node cluster. Chapter 6 is devoted for the conclusion and possible future directions.
3
2 Related Work
The massive size and overwhelming velocity of big data make its processing already a daunt-
ing job, even without the security and privacy features. Cloud computing services [7], which
allow big data processing by small players that lack computational power and storage ca-
pacity, make security and privacy concerns even worse. Data, outsourced to a cloud, must
be encrypted for security protection and any operation on the data, such as search, should
preserve its privacy.
There are a number of works for search over encrypted cloud data, but most are not
suitable for the requirements of big data. Majority of the recent works are based on bilinear
pairing [10, 12, 38]. However, computation costs of pairing based solutions are prohibitively
high both on the server and on the user side. Therefore, pairing based solutions are generally
not practical for big data applications.
Other than the bilinear pairing based methods, there are a number of hashing based so-
lutions. Kuzu et al. [22] proposed a single keyword search method which uses a different
technique based on locality sensitive hashes (LSH). In addition, Wang et al. [37] proposed a
multi-keyword search scheme, which is secure under the random oracle model. This method
uses a hash function to map keywords into a fixed length binary array. Later, an improve-
ment to this work is proposed in [28], which additionally provides strict privacy protection
and ranking capability. Cao et al. [9] proposed another multi-keyword search scheme that
encodes the searchable database index into two binary matrices and uses inner product simi-
larity during matching. This method is inefficient due to huge matrix operations and also not
suitable for ranking according to the relevancy of queries. Recently, O¨rencik et al. [27] pro-
posed another efficient multi-keyword secure search method with ranking capability, which
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is also based on locality sensitive hashes. In this thesis, we adapt the method in [27] to meet
the requirements of big data applications by preserving its superior features such as ranking,
high accuracy and efficiency.
The requirements of processing big data led the big companies like Microsoft and Ama-
zon to develop new technologies that can store and analyze large amounts of structured or
unstructured data in distributed and parallel manner. Some of the most popular examples of
these technologies are the Apache Hadoop project [20], Microsoft Azure [8] and Amazon
Elastic Compute Cloud web service [16, 34]
In addition, tf-idf scoring which is a well-known scoring method for giving weights to
terms of documents is developed for the Hadoop framework by Li and Guoyon [24]. Besides,
the company known as RapidMiner developed the RADOOP tool to calculate tf-idf scores
using Apache Hadoop [4].
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3 Preliminaries and Background
In this chapter, we provide the necessary background on the concepts, the techniques and
algorithms used in the thesis such as locality sensitive hashes, document signatures, NoSQL
databases and distributed file system. We also give a set of definitions that capture the privacy
requirements of a private keyword search algorithm.
3.1 Signature
The essential aspect of privacy-preserving search is examining the similarity between a query
and database elements without leaking the information of search terms in the query. In order
to examine the similarity between a query and a database element, a representation called
signature is created. Signature represents each document as a small set. While the signature
does not provide the exact similarity values, it can be used as a good approximation to accel-
erate the processing. The signatures include several elements which are generated using the
minhash functions. Before defining the minhash function, we first provide basic information
regarding the minhash functions in the following subsections.
3.1.1 Matrix Representation of Sets
Constructing small signatures for huge sets is feasible. We primarily visualize a collection
of sets as a characteristic matrix. Each column in the characteristic matrix represents a set,
which contains certain number of elements, which are shown in the rows. All the elements
contained in all sets form what is referred as the universal set. If there is a “1” in row r and
column c, the set in column c contains the element that corresponds to row r. Otherwise, a
“0” in the same location indicates that the set does not contain the corresponding element.
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In our context, we can think of a document as a set that contains a certain number of
keywords (terms, elements) selected from a dictionary (the universal set). The Table 1 is an
Element S 1 S 2 S 3 S 4
a 1 0 0 1
b 0 0 1 0
c 0 1 0 1
d 1 0 1 1
e 0 0 1 0
Table 1: Matrix Representation of sets
example of a matrix that represents sets S 1, S 2, S 3, and S 4 which contain elements chosen
from the universal set {a, b, c, d, e}. Here, S 1= {a, d}, S 2= {c}, S 3={b, d, e}, and S 4= {a, c, d}.
We use the characteristic matrix for visualization purposes only as storing data in a char-
acteristic matrix is not practical. If data is stored as a characteristic matrix, it will result in a
sparse matrix with too many “0” elements. Therefore, the minhashing technique is used to
represent data in an efficient and effective manner.
3.1.2 Minhash Function
First, we apply a permutation of the elements in the universal set to compute minhash value
of a set. The minhash value of a set represented in a column of the characteristic matrix, is
the index number of the first row containing “1” in the permuted order.
Let the permutation P of the universal set {a, b, c, d, e} be {b, e, a, d, c} as shown by the
matrix in Table 2. The permutation P describes a minhash function h which maps sets to
rows. Let us calculate the minhash value of set S 1 by using the minhash function h. Firstly,
we start with the column of set S 1. Row b has “0”, therefore we go ahead to row e that is
second element in the permuted order P. However, there is again a “0” in the column of S 1.
So, we go ahead to row a, and we come across a “1” in that row. Therefore, the output of the
minhash function is hP (S 1) = a under the permutation P.
To summarize the method in the matrix, we can read off the values of h by scanning from
the top value until we come across a “1”. Thus, we can say that hP (S 2) = c, hP (S 3) = b and
7
Element S 1 S 2 S 3 S 4
b 0 0 1 0
e 0 0 1 0
a 1 0 0 1
d 1 0 1 1
c 0 1 0 1
Table 2: Matrix Representation of sets permuted
hP (S 4) = a. A formal definition of the minhash function of a set is given in the following.
Definition 3.1.1. Minhash[27]: Let ∆ be a finite set of elements, P be a permutation on ∆
and P[i] be the ith element in the permutation P. Minhash of a set S ⊆ ∆ under permutation
P is defined as:
hP(S ) = min({i | 1 ≤ i ≤ |∆| ∧ P[i] ∈ S }) (1)
3.1.3 Minhash Signatures
The minhash signatures can be obtained by applying many randomly chosen permutations as
given in Definition 3.1.1. The characteristic matrix M, represents a collection of sets. We
randomly select λ permutations of the rows of M, which are represented P1, P2, . . . , Pλ.
The minhash functions determined by these permutations are shown as hP1 , hP2 , . . . , hPλ .
Constructing the minhash signature for set S 1 uses the vector
[
hP1(S 1), hP2(S 1), . . . , hPλ(S 1)
]
.
If we represent this list of hash values as a column, we can create a signature matrix from the
characteristic matrix M.
In the proposed method, for each signature, λ different random permutations on the set of
all possible search terms, are used so the final signature of a set S is defined as:
S ig(S ) = {hP1(S ), . . . , hPλ(S )}, (2)
where hP j is the minhash function under permutation P j ∀ j, 1 ≤ j ≤ λ.
The minhash signatures are used as an approximation method for comparing documents
with search queries.
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Each set is mapped into λ different buckets using different hash functions. The minhash
functions provide the property that similar sets are mapped into the same set of buckets with
high probability.
3.2 NoSQL
The term NoSQL is generally used for “not only SQL” or “not relational” database manage-
ment systems. Unlike relational database management systems (RDBMS), NoSQL systems
do not utilize SQL to manipulate data. Thus, functionality and query types are limited in
a NoSQL system, compared to complex query support in a RDBMS. Still, all NoSQL sys-
tems at least support three basic operations: insert, remove, and retrieve. The most important
properties of NoSQL data stores can be summarized as follows [11]:
• Only a limited number of functionalities are offered and are scaled over several servers.
• NoSQL systems are scalable. Data can be partitioned over the servers, and since the
operations provided in a NoSQL system are rather simple, any server can operate inde-
pendently from any other.
• Instead of the ACID properties (atomicity, consistency, isolation, durability), a weaker
concurrency model is used to optimize the overall performance.
• NoSQL systems utilize RAM to store data (thus sacrifice persistence), and aim to an-
swer simple queries very efficiently (e.g. [26]).
• New attributes can dynamically be added to data records.
In order to meet the scalability and reliability requirements, a new class of NoSQL based
data storage technology referred as Key-Value Store [6, 15] is developed and widely adopted.
This system utilizes associative arrays to store the key-value pairs on a distributed sys-
tem. A key-value pair consists of a value and an index key that uniquely identifies that
value. A key-value store offers three basic operations: insert, remove, and retrieve. This
allows distributing data and query load over many servers independently, thus achieve scal-
ability. Furthermore, none of the key-value stores offer secondary index on data, but only
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offer indexing on the primary key. Some popular examples are Amazon’s Dynamo [15] and
Memcached [26].
3.3 Distributed File Systems
It is not possible to process large amounts of data that are in the order of terabytes by using
only a single server, due to their overwhelming storage and computation power requirements.
Therefore, the cloud computing services are utilized to meet these requirements. As a result,
cost can be decreased and much more computing power available in cloud for storing, ac-
cessing, and processing data can be effectively put to use in an affordable way. Most of the
cloud computing platforms use Hadoop [20], which is an open-source distributed and par-
allel computing framework. It provides easy and cost-effective processing solutions for vast
amounts of data. Some popular companies like FaceBook, Yahoo, LinkedIn, Twitter, IBM
etc. use it to manage and analyze the collected unstructured data. The Hadoop framework is
comprised of two main modules which are the Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) [32]
for storing large amounts of data in a distributed manner and accessing it with high through-
put and reliably due to employed redundancy and the MapReduce framework for distributed
processing of large-scale data on commodity computers.
3.3.1 Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS)
The Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) is an open source file system that is inspired by
the Google’s Google File System (GFS) [17]. The HDFS architecture illustrated in Figure 1,
runs on distributed clusters to manage massive datasets. HDFS has some important features
that other existing distributed file systems do not support. Firstly, it is a highly fault-tolerant
system that can work on low-cost hardware. In addition, HDFS enables high throughput
access for application data and streaming access for file system data. HDFS is based on a
master/slave communication model that is composed of a single master node and multiple
data (i.e. slave) nodes. In HDFS, every file is divided into blocks of 64 MB. There exists
a unique node called the NameNode that runs on the master node. The master node man-
ages the file system namespace to arrange the mapping between the files and the blocks and
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Figure 1: Hadoop distributed files system architecture.
regulates the client access to the files [36].
The NameNode is responsible of some file operations such as file opening, file closing,
file deleting and renaming of file names. Also, it provides mapping of blocks to DataNodes.
On the other hand, there are a lot of DataNodes which hold blocks for every slave. DataNodes
manage to block creation, block deletion and replication by using instructions of NameNode
[31, 36].
3.3.2 Hadoop Mapreduce Framework
The Hadoop MapReduce framework is based on the Google’s MapReduce algorithm [14].
The MapReduce programming model is derived from the Map and the Reduce functions
which are used in functional programming paradigm. Hadoop’s MapReduce is the most im-
portant implementation of MapReduce Programming model used in real world applications.
The MapReduce programming model, which processes massive amounts of data, pro-
vides large-scale computations for large clusters by dividing the tasks into parts that can be
processed independently (hence, in parallel). The input data for MapReduce is stored in
HDFS. MapReduce utilizes the key-value pairs for distributing the input data to all the nodes
in the cluster, in a parallel manner [31]. Firstly, the map function processes all key/value
pairs and generates a set of transient key/value pairs. The reduce function, or rather its one
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instance, processes the transient key-value pairs, with the same key. The Jobtracker instance
runs on a single master node to accept the job requests coming from a client and distributes
the configurations to the slave nodes. The TaskTracker instance runs on the slave nodes to
execute the map and reduce functions on a split data in a parallel manner, using the Java
programming language [31]. The map-reduce process is visualized in Figure 2.
3.4 Privacy Requirements
In the literature, the privacy of the data analyzed in big data context is usually protected by
anonymizing the data [39]. However, anonymization techniques are not sufficient to protect
the data privacy. Although a number of searchable encryption and secure keyword search
methods are proposed for the cloud data setting [9, 12, 38], none of them is suitable for big
data.
A secure search method over big data should provide the following privacy requirements.
The definitions are taken from [27].
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Definition 3.4.1. Query Privacy: A secure search protocol has query privacy, if for all poly-
nomial time adversaries A that, given two different set of search terms F0 and F1 and a query
Qb generated from the set Fb, where b ∈R {0, 1}, the advantage of A in finding b is negligible.
Intuitively, the query should not leak the information of the corresponding search terms.
Definition 3.4.2. Data Privacy : A secure search protocol has data privacy, if the encrypted
searchable data does not leak the content (i.e., features) of the documents.
The search method we adapted [27] satisfies both privacy requirements.
3.5 Relevancy Score
The relevancy score is used to sort the matching results with the query. To calculate the
relevancy score, we take advantage of a similarity function. Each matching result of a search
query is ranked with the relevancy score by using the similarity function. There are four well-
known metrics to find the relevancy score in the information retrieval context [25, 27, 29]:
• Term frequency measures how frequently a term occurs in a document. If the term
appears many times in a document, this means that it is more relevant to a query that
contains the term. It is formulated as
t f =
( n
N
)
, (3)
where n is the number of occurrences of the term in the document, and N is the total
number of terms of the document.
• Inverse document frequency measures the importance of a term to distinguish a docu-
ment that contains it. It means that if a term does not appear frequently in the dataset,
but appears in a particular document, then this search term has a higher relevancy score
for this document. The inverse document frequency of a search term is computed using
the formula
id f = log
( |D|
d
)
, (4)
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where |D| is the total number of documents in the dataset D and d is the number of
documents that contain this term.
• Document length (Density) stipulates that if two documents include identical number
of terms, the shorter document is more relevant with query.
• Completeness stipulates that more search terms the document has, the higher score the
document has.
In the information retrieval context, the results are required to be ordered according to
their relevancy with the query. Therefore, the tf-idf scoring [25, 27] generally is used as the
scoring metric in the information retrieval applications. In addition, it evaluates the impor-
tance of a term within a document for the dataset. The term frequency (tf) and the inverse
document (idf) are put together to form the tf-idf score. The tf-idf of a term in a documentD
is given by
tf-idf = tf × idf.
Additionally, the idf’s log function always has the ratio that is exactly larger than or equal
to 1. Therefore, the value of idf is larger than or equal to 0. Finally, the tf-idf score is a real
number larger than or equal to 0.
Since we use encryption algorithms in our proposal, the relevancy score (rs) should be
an integer value; therefore, we multiply a tf-idf score with an appropriately chosen scaling
factor and then apply rounding operation to obtain an integer value.
3.6 Secure Search Method
The utilized privacy preserving search method is based on the method by O¨rencik et al. [27].
In this section, we briefly explain the method for completeness and refer the reader to [27] for
the details. The search method is based on the minhashing technique [30]. Each document is
represented by minhash signatures, which are constant length sets as explained in Section 3.1.
While the signatures hide the information of document features, they still provide a good rep-
resentation for the underlying features. During the similarity comparison, only the signatures
are used and the underlying document feature sets are not revealed to server, assumed to hold
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the data and not necessarily being fully trusted (e.g. cloud server). This method cannot pro-
vide the exact similarity value, but it can still provide an accurate estimation. The signature
of a document is defined in Section 3.1.3.
3.6.1 Index Generation
In [27], the index generation is assumed to be an oﬄine operation initiated by the data owner
and creates the secure searchable index that is outsourced to the cloud as data is regarded as
static. The searchable index generation process is based on the bucketization technique [19,
21] which is a well known method for data partitioning. The idea of bucketization is utilized
in the proposed method. Here, each data object is distributed into several buckets by using
minhash functions introduced previously.
In addition, the bucket identifier is used as an identifier for each object in the correspond-
ing bucket. For each minhash function and corresponding output pair, a bucket is created
with bucket identifier B jk (i.e., j
th minhash function produces output k).
Each document identifier is distributed into λ different buckets depending on the λ ele-
ments of the document’s minhash signature. The number of common buckets between two
objects indicates their similarity. Having no common bucket indicates that the documents
do not have any common term. In addition to the document identifiers, the corresponding
relevancy scores (i.e., tf-idf scores) are also added to the bucket content (VB jk).
Note that, both the bucket identifiers (B jk) and the content vectors (VB jk) are sensitive infor-
mation that needs to be encrypted before outsourcing them to the cloud. A secure searchable
index I, which is the combination of the encrypted bucket identifiers and the corresponding
encrypted content vectors, is generated to allow private search over encrypted data.
The following phases, which are feature extraction, bucket index construction and bucket
index encryption [27, 29] are used to generate the secure searchable index I.
1- Feature Extraction: The set of features Fi = { fi1, . . . , fiz} is extracted for every
document Di ∈ D, where D is the set of all documents in the dataset. The set of features
distinguishes the document. In the scheme, the features are made up of two values, namely
fi j = (wi j, rsi j). A keyword wi j of the document is the first value. The relevancy score (rsi j)
is the second value which is generated by using tf-idf scoring of the keyword wi j for docu-
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ment Di as explained in Section 3.5. Subsequently, we need this relevancy score to rank the
matching results utilized in the search method (cf. Section 3.6.3).
2- Bucket Index Construction : To begin with, by selecting λ random permutations
on the set of all search terms (∆), λ minhash functions are generated. Then, these minhash
functions are applied on the first values of the feature sets, namely F∗i = {wi1, . . . ,wiz}, of
each document as explained in Section 3.1.2. Consequently a signature for each document is
generated as
S ig(Di) = {hP1(F∗i ), . . . , hPλ(F∗i )}.
Note that ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , λ}, hP j(F∗i ) ∈ F∗i . In other words, the outputs of the hash functions are
one of the keywords of the input set.
Then, the elements of the signature of the document are used to map feature set of each
document to λ buckets. Let hP j(F
∗
i ) = wk, then document Di is added to the bucket that have
the identifiers j for the permutation and k for the output (i.e., B jk). For example, if B
j
k is a
bucket identifier and VB jk is the corresponding content vector, then VB jk[id(Di)] = rs ji if and
only if Di ∈ B jk;VB jk[id(Di)] = 0, otherwise.
3- Bucket Index Encryption : Due to the privacy requirements, the bucket identifiers
and bucket contents should be encrypted. The bucket identifier B jk is a sensitive information,
since it may disclose a search term in a query. Therefore, bucket identifier must be encrypted.
Moreover, the server maps the bucket with the bucket identifier without knowing the decryp-
tion keys. Hence, the encryption method should use a deterministic scheme to hide the bucket
identifier. HMAC function is one such method that can hide the information in a deterministic
way. An HMAC function can be obtained using cryptographic hash functions with a secret
key. In the given scheme, since we do not need to decrypt to the encrypted bucket identifier,
HMAC functions are used for hashing the bucket identifiers. In addition, we can generate a
secret key Ks for encryption and utilize this secret key for the HMAC function. The secret
key of the HMAC function should be known only by the data owner and never disclosed
to the server. We denote the encrypted bucket identifier as piB jk = HMACKs(B
j
k). The bucket
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content vector (VB jk) has also sensitive information, namely the identifiers of the documents in
that bucket and their relevancy scores. The untrusted server should not learn this information;
therefore only encrypted versions of these values are outsourced to the server.
The secure index generation method is described in Algorithm 1as given in [27].
Algorithm 1 Index Generation [27]
Require: ∆:set of possible keywords, D: collection of documents, h: λ minhash functions,
Ψ: security parameter
Ks = S etup(Ψ),
for all Di ∈ D do
Fi ← extract features of Di
S ig(Di) = {hP1(F∗i ), . . . , hPλ(F∗i )}
for j = 1→ λ do
B jk = S ig(Di)[ j − 1]
if B jk < bucket identifier list then
add B jk to bucket identifier list
create VB jk
end if
add rs jk to vector VB jk[id(Di)]
end for
end for
for all B jk ∈ bucket identifier list do
piB jk
← HMACKs(B jk)
VB jk ← EncKs(VB jk)
add (piB jk ,VB jk) to secure index I
end for
return I
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3.6.2 Query Generation
The query is generated in the same way as generating secure index entries (Section 3.6.1).
Given the set of keywords in a query (to search for documents that contain them with high
relevancy scores) (i.e., F = {w′1, . . . ,w′n}), the query signature is generated by using the same
minhash functions used in the index generation phase. The elements of the query signature
are indeed the identifiers of the buckets that include the documents that contain the queried
keywords. The bucket identifiers in the query signature are obtained by the HMAC function
using the same secret key used in the index generation. Therefore, the query Q is the set of
encrypted bucket identifiers (i.e., Q = {pi1, . . . , piλ}). Independent of the number of queried
keywords, the query signature, hence the query itself, has constant length, which is λ.
We utilize the Jaccard distance in order to analyze the difference between two query sig-
natures. Let A and B be two sets, then Jaccard distance is given as follows:
Jd(A, B) = 1 − |A
⋂
B|
|A ⋃ B| (5)
In Algorithm 2, query generation is formally described as given in [27]:
Algorithm 2 Query Generation [27]
Require: F: feature set of keywords to be queried,
h: λ minhash functions, Ks: encryption key
S ig(F) = {hP1(F[0]), . . . , hPλ(F[0])}
for j = 1→ λ do
B jk = S ig(F)[ j − 1]
piB jk
← HMACKs(B jk)
Q[ j − 1] = piB jk
end for
return Q
3.6.3 Secure Search
In the search phase, first, the query Q is accepted by the cloud server. Then, the cloud server
finds the requested encrypted content vectors (VB jk). These content vectors are related to the
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bucket identifiers of the query. After that, the λ encrypted vectors EV = {V1, . . . ,Vλ} are sent
back to the user by the cloud server. Then, the user receives the encrypted content vectors,
decrypts them and ranks the document identifiers using the tf-idf scores. The search method
is described in Algorithm 3 as given in [27].
Algorithm 3 Secure Search [27]
Require: I: secure index, Q: query
for all piB jk ∈ Q do
if (piB jk ,VB jk) ∈ I then
addVB jk to EV
end if
end for
send EV to the user
3.7 Document Retrieval
Generally, returning documents that are unrelated to the search query bring about an unnec-
essary communication burden for the user which the user wants to minimize. Therefore, the
user does not basically retrieve all the documents that have at least one common bucket with
the query. Instead, only the top t matching results are retrieved by the user. We use the tf-idf
score for ranking the matching results since the tf-idf scoring is the standard formula for find-
ing the document-term weights [30]. This method is used especially in the search operation
to calculate the relevancy score. The user receives the encrypted vectors EV = {V1, . . . ,Vλ},
decrypts them to obtain the plaintext vectors Vi = DecKs(Vi). The user, then, sorts the docu-
ments by using their scores.
The score of a document Di (i.e., score(Di)) is obtained as summing the relevancy scores
for the buckets which are shared by both the document and the query. The formula is defined
as follows:
score(Di) =
λ∑
k=1
Vk[Di].
If the score(Di) gets higher, it is expected that the relevancy of the corresponding document
to the query increases.
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After the sorting the scores, the user receives the top t matches from the server. The
document retrieval method is described in Algorithm 4 as given in [27].
Algorithm 4 Document Retrieval [27]
USER:
Require: EV : encrypted vectors, Ks: secret key,
t: limit for number of documents to retrieve
for allVi ∈ EV do
Vi ← DecKs(Vi)
end for
for j = 1→ |Vi| do
score( j) =
∑λ
i=1 Vi[ j]
end for
sort score list
idList← identifiers of top t scores
send idList to Server
SERVER
Require: idList: requested document identifiers, EDoc: outsourced encrypted documents
for all id ∈idList do
if (id,Ωid) ∈ EDoc then
send (id,Ωid) to user
end if
end for
USER:
Did ← DecKs(Ωid)
3.8 Calculation of TF-IDF in Hadoop Framework using Map-Reduce
Functions
Generally, certain software tools are used for calculating tf-idf scores of documents such as
the Rapid Miner, which is a popular text mining tool. However, for the big data applications,
using this tool is not efficient and useful. Thus, Li and Guoyong [24] proposed an efficient
method for calculating tf-idf scores on the Hadoop parallel computation framework. We
use their algorithm to calculate tf-idf scores in our test datasets. The Hadoop distributed
computing platform is based on partitioning the task and running on partitions concurrently.
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If we inspect the formula for the calculation of tf-idf scores, we can see that tf-idf formula is
very suitable for distributed computing.
The tf-idf scoring has two part as mentioned them in detail in section 3.5. The first part,
the term frequency, is the number of times a term appears in a document therefore, we can
compute it in a distributed manner using partitioning the dataset into nodes. This can be
done in a very efficient manner in the MapReduce framework. After the term frequencies
are computed, inverse document frequency (the second part of tf-idf) can be calculated using
the number of documents containing a specific term, which is known after the first phase.
Moreover, since the number of documents that contain a term are now known and fixed in
static dataset scenario, we can compute tf-idf scores in parallel. The authors [24] design three
MapReduce processes to this end, which are described below.
3.8.1 The number of words in a document
In the first phase of the computation, the aim is to find the number of occurrences of the term
in a document. One can explain this process in more detail in terms of mapper and reducer
functions. The mapper function produces key-value pairs as follows
<< term#documentName >, 1 >,
where the key is a combination of a term (word) and the document that contains the term.
These pairs are used as intermediate values which will be processed by the reducer function.
Later, the number of occurrences of the term in document is calculated directly in the reducer
part by combining the pairs with the same key value. Finally, the results of the reducer should
be written to the intermediate file (temporaryFile1). The file contains key-value pairs as
<< term#documentName >, n >,
where n is the number of occurrences of term in the document documentName. The map and
reduce functions are formally described in Algorithm 5.
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Algorithm 5 calculate the number of occurrences of the term in document
MAP FUNCTION 1
Input: < documentLineNumber, contents >
Output: << term#documentName >, 1 >
REDUCE FUNCTION 1
Input: << term#documentName >, 1 >
Output: << term#documentName >, n >
3.8.2 The total number of words of each document
In the second phase, the map function uses temporary f ile1 to compute the total number
of term (word) in each document. Reorganizing of the < key, value > pairs is needed in
this process. The pair < documentName, < term = n >> is generated as key-value pairs
in the mapper function. Then, the total number of terms of each document is calculated in
the reducer function. The output of the reducer should be written to an intermediate file
(temporaryFile2) since its content will be processed in the reducer function. The output of
the reducer is
<< term#documentName >, < n/N >>,
where n is the number of occurrences of term in the document documentName, and N is the
total number of terms of the document documentName. The map and reducer functions are
described in Algorithm 6.
3.8.3 Calculation of TF-IDF in Hadoop Framework
In the last stage, the < key, value > pairs are reorganized in the mapper function. The mapper
generates key-value pairs as
< term, < documentName#n/N >>
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Algorithm 6 calculate the number of occurrences of the term in document
MAP FUNCTION 2
Input: << term#documentName >, n >
Output: < documentName, < term = n >>
REDUCE FUNCTION 2
Input: < documentName, < term = n >>
Output: << term#documentName >, < n/N >>
Then, the reducer, using the term as the key value, can compute the tf-idf score of the term
using the formula
t f -id f =
n
N
· log ( |D|
d
),
where D is the total number of documents in the dataset and d is the number of documents
that contain the term. The last MapReduce phase is described in Algorithm 7.
Algorithm 7 calculate the number of occurrences of the term in document
MAP FUNCTION 3
Input: << term#documentName >, < n/N >>
Output: < term, < documentName#n/N >>
REDUCE FUNCTION 3
Input: < term, < documentName#n/N >>
Output: << term#documentName >, < (d/D), (n/N), t f − id f >>
3.9 Datasets
We need a dataset to test the proposed system and show its effectiveness, efficiency and
scalability. We use both real and synthetic datasets in our analysis. The real dataset used in
the experiments is only a small part of the Enron Corpus data, which is a large database of
over 517,000 emails generated by 158 employees of the Enron Corporation [2]. The synthetic
dataset is generated to test the efficiency of the proposed system.
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4 Problem Definition
The system requirements for secure and privacy-preserving keyword search and document
access scheme over encrypted cloud data are specified in the previous chapter. In this chap-
ter, we give detailed information about the protocol design of the proposed scheme. Mainly,
we provide more comprehensive descriptions for the steps of the algorithm of the protocols
developed for the Hadoop framework. These algorithms are implemented in the real envi-
ronment and tested by using real and synthetic datasets. As the real dataset, Enron mails are
preferred since the size of the documents in the Enron dataset is substantially large for our
test efforts.
In this thesis, we consider privacy-preserving keyword search over encrypted cloud data
for the database outsourcing scenario as illustrated in Figure 4.1. In the system, we assume
that there are three entities, namely the data owner, the server and users.
4.1 Requirements of the Proposed Scheme
1. Data Owner is the actual entity that is responsible for the establishment of the database.
The data owner collects and/or generates the information in the database. The owner
does not have sufficient resources or is unwilling to store the whole database. So, the
owner outsources the data to an untrusted, semi-honest server ( trusted but curious).
The data owner encrypts the sensitive documents to be outsourced and generates a
searchable index using the features of these sensitive documents.
2. Server is a professional entity (e.g., cloud server) that offers information services to
authorized users. It is often required that the server should be oblivious to content of
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the database it maintains, the search terms in queries and documents retrieved. Ad-
ditionally, the cloud server should not learn anything other than that the data owner
allows to leak.
3. Users are the members in a group who are entitled to access (part of) the information of
the database. Users may send queries consisting of multiple keywords and receive the
documents associated with these queried keywords. Finally, user decrypts the retrieved
documents using the decryption key.
4.1.1 Cloudera CDH
Cloudera Inc. provides Cloudera CDH which is the most popular distribution of Apache
Hadoop. It is an open-source technology which includes some different projects such as
Apache Hive, Apache Avro, Apache HBase, etc. Also, it offers Hadoop platform by combin-
ing these all projects.
In this thesis, we used the Cloudera CDH 4.7.0 version by installing the Cloudera Man-
ager. Thanks to Cloudera Manager, configuration of Hadoop is very easy. In Figures 4, 5
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and 6, we give screen shots of the Cloudera Manager Admin Console. Using this console
showed in Figure 4, we can perform actions for different configurations such as adding new
service or role, adding and deleting hosts etc. In Figure 5 and 6, we show the screen shots of
the Hue console used to manage the jobTracker and file server. We upload the data to HDFS
by using this console, and we can add map-reduce files that are project codes to run on our
data. In addition, we can check the output files after having run our map-reduce functions.
In addition, Hadoop Framework has three types to be able to create the cluster, which
are Standalone mode (single node cluster), Pseudo distributed mode (single node cluster) and
Fully-distributed mode (multi-node cluster). In this thesis, we run our project in the Fully-
Distributed Mode Multi-Node Hadoop cluster.
Figure 4: Screen shot of Cloudera Manager Admin Consol
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Figure 5: Screen shot of Hue which is in File Browser Tab
Figure 6: Screen shot of Hue which is in Job Browser Tab
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4.1.2 Using Hadoop Commands
In this section, we define fundamental and required commands related to execution of the
Cloudera Hadoop Framework [13].
• Starting the cluster is performed in two phases. Firstly, we begin with starting the
HDFS daemons using the command: “./start-dfs.sh ”
– The NameNode daemon is started on the master node.
– The DataNode daemons are started on all slaves (here: master and slave).
• Then, we start the MapReduce daemons using this command: “./start-yarn.sh ”
– The JobTracker is started on the master,
– The DataNode daemons are started on all slaves (here: master and slave).
• After starting, we check following Java processes that should run on master using the
command: “jps”.
– S econdarynamenode
– NodeManager
– NameNode
– DataNode
– ResourceManager
– jps
• to return the list of a directory with direct children we use the command: “ls”.
– hdfs dfs −ls hdfs: //localhost:9000/user/hduser/
• to copy source paths to stdout we use the command: “cat”.
– hdfs dfs −cat hdfs: //localhost:9000/ user/hduser/output/part-r-00000
• to delete files specified recursively we use the command: “rm”.
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– hdfs dfs −rm −R hdfs: //localhost:9000/user/hduser/output
• to copy single src, or multiple srcs from local file system to the destination filesystem
we use the command: “copyFromLocal”
– hdfs dfs −copyFromLocal file: ///home/hduser/Desktop/file.txt
hdfs: //localhost:9000/user/hduser
4.2 Challenges
As the name implies, the concept of big data implies a massive dynamic dataset that contains a
great variety of data types. There are several dimensions in big data that makes management a
very challenging issue. The primary aspects of big data is best defined by its volume (amount
of data), velocity (data change rate) and variety (range of data types) [23].
Unfortunately, standard off-the-shelf data mining and database management tools cannot
capture or process these massive, unstructured datasets within a acceptable time period [33].
This led to the development of new technologies adapted for the requirements of big data. In
order to meet the scalability and reliability requirements, a new class of NoSQL based data
storage technology referred as Key-Value Store [15] is developed and widely adopted.
This system utilizes associative arrays to store the key-value pairs on a distributed system.
A key-value pair consists of a value and an index key that uniquely identifies that value.
This allows distributing data and query load over many servers independently, thus achieve
scalability. Furthermore, none of the Key-Value Stores offer secondary index on data, but
only offer indexing on the primary key. We also adapt the key-value store approach in the
proposed method, where the details are explained in Section 3.3. While the bucket identifiers
are used as the key, the corresponding encrypted documents identifiers and scores are stored
as the value.
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4.3 Preprocessing Operations Before Computing Tf-idf
In this section, we explain the preprocessing steps in detail and software tools used in the
procedure. We need the preprocessing steps to obtain more efficient computation of tf-idf
scores with the Hadoop framework. The preprocessing steps are illustrated in Figure 7.
Transformation
Operation
Sequence 
Files
Text 
Files
Tokenizing
Stemming 
the words
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Figure 7: Preprocessing Operations Before Computing Tf-idf
4.3.1 SequenceFile
The Hadoop framework does not offer great performance for a dataset with files which are
smaller than the typical HDFS Block size. If Hadoop held huge amounts of small files, it
would cause the memory overhead for the NameNode.
We use Enron dataset which has relatively short emails as the input files. Therefore, to
solve the overhead problem with the small files we utilize SequenceFile format, which is a
flat file consisting of binary key/value pairs. As an original contribution to the MapReduce
algorithms for tf-idf computation in [24], we use SequenceFile format for efficient computa-
tion of tf-idf values of small files. Thus, we easily overcome the problems such as the storage
overhead and time-consuming processes thanks to SequenceFile format used for the input
files in Hadoop. SequenceFile is a binary storage format that consists of binary key/value
pairs. If there are excessively many small files in text format, SequenceFile is used as a con-
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tainer to store them. The advantage of SequenceFile is that the small files can be compressed
and will still be splittable unlike text format files. On the other hand, files in normal text for-
mat, which are compressed, cannot be splittable to assign them to different nodes. Therefore,
we prefer SequenceFile for input files before calculating tf-idf score.
4.3.2 Some Filters using Lucene in Hadoop
Documents should be processed using some filtering techniques such as tokenizing, stem-
ming, removing stop words, (typical steps applied by RapidMiner, which is a widely used
machine learning tool to compute tf-idf values [1] before running the tf-idf computation al-
gorithm. For filtering, we prefer Apache Lucene tool, which is a widespread open source
information retrieval software library [3]. The Lucene has the most important API to be able
to perform stemming operation and remove stop words which are ”a”, ”an”, ”and”, ”are”,
”their”, ”the”, etc. Therefore, we developed a preprocessing program by utilizing the Apache
Lucene, which returns documents that contain only key words or search terms.
4.4 Protocol of the Proposed Scheme for Hadoop Framework
In the previous system [29], it is possible to process datasets with relatively small number
of documents. Since we work with big data, which is huge both in number of data items
and their sizes, and rapidly changing, we need to use a distributed computation environment
that can cope with the associated challenges. Therefore, we exploit the Hadoop framework
which is based on the distributed file systems and parallel programming techniques such as
the Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) and the MapReduce programming. The HDFS
architecture runs on distributed clusters to manage massive datasets. The HDFS is based on
a master / slave communication model that is composed of a single master node and multiple
data (i.e., slave) nodes. The MapReduce programming model, used to processes massive data,
provides large-scale computations for large clusters by dividing the data into independent
splits. The input data for MapReduce is stored in the HDFS. The MapReduce programming
model utilizes the key-value pairs for distributing the input data to all the nodes in the cluster,
in a parallel manner. In this scheme, unlike the previous work in [29], we address the
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bucket identifier as key in key-value pairs and we use three computers for Hadoop clusters
which have a master and two slave machines. Moreover, we also propose a lazy idf-updating
method that can efficiently maintain the tf-idf scores in a large and dynamically changing
dataset. With the lazy idf-updating method, very close estimates on the real tf-idf scores can
be calculated in a very efficient manner. Therefore, the proposal is suitable in the Big Data
setting. In the subsequent sections, we give the Index Generation algorithm for Hadoop and
explain the lazy idf-updating method in more detail.
4.4.1 Index Generation with Hadoop
In the Hadoop framework, we use Map-Reduce functions for calculating a searchable index
item for each document. Here, as input we use document name as the key and the contents of
the documents are the value for the map function. In the map function, minhash signatures of
documents are computed. Since Minhash functions used in document signatures are created
randomly and used by all cluster nodes, they are kept in the distributed cache for easy access
by the cluster nodes. The key for the output of the map function is the bucket identifier (buck-
etID) and the value is < documentName, score > pairs. Then, reordering is applied before
the reduce function. Finally, in the Reduce Function, we use the output of the map function
as the input. Lastly, we use the bucketID as the key for the output of the reduce function and
all < documentName, score > pairs in the corresponding bucket. The MapReduce phase of
the Index Generation operation is defined in Algorithm 8.
4.4.2 Secure Search with Hadoop
Firstly, the user generates the bucketIDs of a query using the query generation algorithm given
in Algorithm 2. Then, the bucketIDs are sent to the server to be matched with the buckets
which contain the related documents. In order to perform the search operation in Hadoop,
bucketIDs are placed in the distributed cache that distributes and copies the files among the
nodes since all nodes should use the same bucketIDs for each query. In addition, before
the searching operation, the data owner should create all bucketIDs for every documents and
outsources them to the server, which is explained in Section 3.6.3.
In the map function, each cluster node retrieves the bucketIDs of the query from the
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Algorithm 8 Index Generation Algorithm
MAP FUNCTION
Distributed Cache: Minhash Functions
Input: < documentName, contents >
Output: < bucketID, < documentName, score >>
REDUCE FUNCTION
Input: < bucketID, < documentName, score >>
Output: < bucketID, (< documentName1, score1 >, ..., < documentNamen, scoren >) >
distributed cache and the output file of the index generation phase, which has bucketID as
the key, and all < documentName, score > pairs as the value for the input file of the map
function. For the matching buckets, the map function returns the bucketID as the key and
a document in the corresponding bucket and its score as the value. It performs the same
operation for every document in the bucket. The reduce function gets the reordered outputs
of the map function as the input file. Then, it merges pairs of the value that has the same
bucketID. Lastly, the output file of the reduce function contains the potentially relevant doc-
uments. Note that the key value of the reduce function bucketID is the query bucket ids. The
MapReduce phase of the secure search operation is described in Algorithm 9.
4.4.3 Insertion operation with Hadoop
The insertion operation is used to add a new data file to the index file. Therefore, the
bucketIDs of the new file should be generated by the data owner. Map function 1 in Al-
gorithm 10 is used to generate the bucketIDs of the new file. The map function in Algo-
rithm 10 uses document name as the input key and the contents of the documents as the
input value. Then, the map function returns an output that includes bucketID as the key and
< documentName, score > pair as the value.
Simultaneously, map function 2 gets the input file that is the output of the index gener-
ation operation. In addition, map function 2 scans all buckets and produces < bucketID, <
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Algorithm 9 Secure Search Algorithm
MAP FUNCTION
Distributed Cache: BucketIDs for search query
Input: < bucketID, (< documentName1, score1 >, ..., < documentNamen, scoren >) >
Output: < bucketID, < documentName, score >>
REDUCE FUNCTION
Input: < bucketID, < documentName, score >>
Output: < bucketID, (< documentName, score1 >, ..., < documentName, scoren >) >
documentName, score >> as the key-value pair, which reflects the index file before the in-
sertion operation. The aim is to merge all < documentName, score > pairs with the same
bucketID, generated by map function 1 and map function 2. Before Reduce function, the
outputs of both map functions are reordered automatically.
In the reduce function, < bucketID, < documentName, score >> pairs that are the outputs
of the map functions are used as the input file. As the output file, bucketID as the key and the
chain of < documentNamei, scorei > as the value, which are merged according to the key, are
generated. The MapReduce phase of the insertion operation is described in Algorithm 10.
4.4.4 Deletion operation with Hadoop
The deletion operation is implemented to remove documents from the data set and thus to
update the index. Initially, we find the bucketIDs of the documents that will be deleted. In the
deletion operation, we have two map functions and also two reduce functions. Map function 1
is used to generate to the bucketIDs of the deleted documents. It is similar to map function 1
of the insertion operation. We again use the distributed cache to share the Minhash functions
among the nodes in map function 1. For the input file, < documentName, contents > pairs
are used in the map function 1. The documentName is used as the key and the contents of the
documents are used as the value. And as the output file, < bucketID, documentName > are
generated as key-value pairs. Then, these outputs are reordered according to a common key
34
Algorithm 10 Insertion Operation Algorithm
MAP FUNCTION 1
Distributed Cache: Minhash Functions
Input: < newdocumentName, contents >
Output: < bucketID, < newdocumentName, score >>
MAP FUNCTION 2
Input: < bucketID, (< documentName1, score1 >, ..., < documentNamen, scoren >) >
Output: < bucketID, < documentName, score >>
REDUCE FUNCTION
Input: < bucketID, < documentName, score >
Output: < bucketID, (documentName1, score1 >, ..., < documentNamen+1, scoren+1) >
automatically before the reduce function 1. And it generates the chain of the documentName
as value for each bucketID in reduce function 1, which are basically the deleted documents
in the corresponding bucket.
Reduce function 1 places its output in the distributed cache, from which map function 2
retrieves the documents in the corresponding buckets. All cluster nodes access the distributed
cache to remove the indexes of the deleted files. In addition, as the input file, map function 2
takes the output of the index generation operation. BucketID is used as the key and the chain
of the < documentName, score > pair are used as the value in map function 2. Simply
speaking, map function 2 returns the documents that are not deleted for each bucket.
Before the reduce function, reordering is made automatically over undeleted documents
and finally, all undeleted documents are merged according to the common key, which is the
output file of the reduce function 2. The MapReduce phases of the deletion operation are
described in Algorithm 11, where x is the number of deleted documents.
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Algorithm 11 Deletion Operation Algorithm
MAP FUNCTION 1
Distributed Cache: Minhash Functions
Input: < documentName, contents >
Output: < bucketID, documentName >
REDUCE FUNCTION 1
Input: < bucketID, documentName >
Output: < bucketID, (< documentName1, ..., documentNamex >) >
MAP FUNCTION 2
Distributed Cache: < bucketID, < documentName1, ..., documentNamex >>
Input: < bucketID, (< documentName1, score1 >, ..., < documentNamen, scoren >) >
Output: < bucketID, undeletedDocumentName >
REDUCE FUNCTION 2
Input: < bucketID, undeletedDocumentName >
Output: < bucketID, (undeletedDocumentName1, ..., undeletedDocumentNamen−x) >
4.5 Lazy idf Update
When the dataset is changed, by adding new files, deleting or updating existing files, the
index should also be updated. Even a small change to the data set, such as adding or deleting
a single document, can result in the idf value of a search term. Therefore, potentially we may
have to recalculate the index for every document containing the term whose idf is changed.
We formalize the discussion in the following.
Let a new document D contain k previously indexed terms. If this new document D is
added to the dataset, the scores of all the documents that contain any of those k terms should
be updated since their tf-idf scores change. However, dynamically applying this change for
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each single data item, added or removed from the dataset, is not feasible. Hence, we propose
a lazy idf-updating method which aims to maintain the scores of existing documents as they
are and only set a new score for the newly added items. Moreover, calculating the idf of each
term of a newly added data item is still a costly operation that requires scanning the whole
dataset. In order to reduce the cost of scoring, we propose keeping the idf values of the terms
separately. As new data elements are added, the idf values slightly change and the stored
idf values will not be exactly correct. However, they still provide accurate estimates since
the size of the existing dataset is much larger than the size of the data elements added. In a
timely bases1 (e.g., every 20 minutes), the whole dataset is scanned and all the idf values are
updated with the exact results.
Due to the privacy requirements, the server cannot see the actual documents, but only
stores the encrypted versions. It is not possible to calculate, neither the term frequencies, nor
the inverse document frequencies from the encrypted data, therefore a trusted proxy should
be used for updating the tf-idf scores. Each new data item is first indexed and encrypted by
the proxy and then uploaded to the server. Similarly, the idf value updating operation is also
done by the proxy. Therefore, the idf values that are separately stored are only kept in the
trusted proxy. Since the idf value updating operation is performed by the proxy, the cloud
server will be up and running during this period and the search operation can be done using
the existing relevancy scores.
We assume that the size of the dataset will be very large, hence the effect of the additional
items on the idf values will be very limited. Note that, the term frequency (tf) part of the
tf-idf score is calculated using only the document itself. Therefore, the change in the dataset
does not affect the tf values of the existing items. With this lazy idf-updating method, very
close estimates on the real tf-idf scores can be calculated in a very efficient way, hence it is
suitable in the big data setting. The actual comparative results using a large, real dataset is
provided in Section 5.3.
1The update frequency can be set according to the change rate of the dataset.
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5 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we extensively analyze and demonstrate efficiency and effectiveness of the
proposed method. The entire system is implemented by Java language using 64-bit Ubuntu
12.04 LTS operating system. In order to observe the benefits of distributed file systems, a
multi-node Hadoop cluster is configured. The interface of Cloudera CDH4 with a three node
(i.e., computer) cluster is utilized in the experiments. Two of the computers have an Intel
Xeon CPU E5-1650 @ 3.5 GHz processor with 12 cores, 15.6 GB of main memory and the
other computer has an Intel i7 @ 3.07 GHz processor with 8 cores and 15.7 GB of main
memory.
In our experiments, we used the Enron dataset [2], which is a real dataset that contains
approximately 517.000 email documents. For encrypting bucket contents, the AES algorithm
is used in the CTR mode.
To evaluate the accuracy of the search scheme we use two metrics, namely precision and
recall rates. Success of a search scheme can best be analyzed using these metrics.
Let R(F) be used to show the set of items, which are retrieved for a query with feature set
F. Furthermore, let R∗(F) be a subset of R(F), whose elements contain all the features in F.
Lastly, letD(F) denote the set of items that contain all the features in F.
Therefore, we have R∗(F) ⊆ R(F) and R∗(F) ⊆ D(F); and precision (prec(F)), recall
(rec(F)), average precision (aprec(F)) and average recall (arec(F)) for a setF = {F1, . . . , Fn}
can be given as follows: [27]
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prec(F) =
R∗(F)
R(F)
, aprec(F ) =
n∑
i=1
prec(Fi)
n
(6)
rec(F) =
R∗(F)
D(F) , arec(F ) =
n∑
i=1
rec(Fi)
n
(7)
5.1 Performance of the Method
In this section, we present the experiment results, where we measure the time spent for gen-
erating the secure searchable index and applying search operation.
The index generation time for 517.000 documents, is given in Figure 8 for different val-
ues of λ. The experiments demonstrate that the index generation, which is the most time
consuming part of the method, can be done in only a few minutes. And the system can in-
dex about 2750 documents per second for λ = 100. Note that this operation is performed
only after the change in the dataset, due to the documents being added, exceeds a threshold.
Moreover, since this operation is done by a trusted proxy, the cloud server can still continue
to serve the incoming search requests, using the existing index.
Figure 8: Index Generation Time as λ change
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Figure 9: Search Time
The search operation has two major parts. Firstly, the server fetches the content vectors
of the queried buckets and sends them to the user. Then, the user (or trusted proxy) decrypts
those vectors and sorts the document identifiers according to the corresponding relevancy
scores. Unfortunately, due to the distributed setting of the Hadoop file system, finding the
queried buckets requires a search over all the buckets. Figure 9 demonstrates the average
search time required both for the server and user sides, in the dataset of 517.000 documents.
5.2 Accuracy of the Method
In the information retrieval community, two of the most common metrics for measuring the
accuracy of a method are precision and recall. The metrics compare the expected and the
actual results of the evaluated system. Precision measures the ratio of correctly found matches
over the total number of returned matches. Recall, on the other hand, measures the ratio of
correctly found matches over the total number of the correct matches. Both precision and
recall are real values between 0 and 1, where the higher the value the better the accuracy is.
In the case of a single term search, the proposed method guarantees all the matches that
have non-zero relevancy scores, contain the searched term. Hence, retrieving all the items
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with non-zero scores satisfies perfect precision and recall. In the case of multiple keyword
searches, the matches with non-zero scores definitely contain at least one of the queried key-
words but it may or may not contain all. We test the accuracy of the method for multi-term
queries with λ = 100 (i.e., signature length) using the precision and recall metrics. The av-
erage precision and recall rates for a set of 20 queries with 2 and 3 keywords are given in
Figure 10 and 11, respectively. The retrieval ratio in the figures represents the ratio of the
documents with nonzero scores that are considered as a relevant match with the query. The
figures show that while the precision decreases as retrieval ratio increases (i.e., more docu-
ments are considered as match), the recall increases. The retrieval ratio can be selected by the
user according to the requirements of the application. The figures also show that the increase
in the number of keywords decreases the precision, but increases recall. The main reason
of this is that, as the number of queried terms increases only very few documents contain
all the queried terms which have a positive effect on recall. However, this also increases the
documents with nonzero scores (i.e., contain at least one of the queried terms) which have a
negative effect on precision.
Figure 10: Average Precision Rate, λ = 100
Although the precision and recall metrics are very commonly used and very suitable for
several problems such as conjunctive search and relational database search over structured
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Figure 11: Average Recall Rate, λ = 100
data, they may not be very accurate for multi-keyword search over unstructured data. The
main difference between search over structured and unstructured data is that, in the case
of structured data, each field has an equal importance and the corresponding results should
satisfy all the queried features. However, in the case of search over unstructured data, some
of the queried features may be significantly more important than the others. For example, let
a query have three features and a document contain only two of those features but with very
high tf-idf scores. The precision and recall metrics will consider this document as a false
match since it does not contain all the queried features, but in the case of big data application
where the data is unstructured, we claim that, this document is very relevant with the given
query and should be considered as a match.
It is important to note that, precision and recall metrics cannot consider the importance of
the queried features in the compared document hence, may not perfectly measure the success
rate of a search method over data. Therefore, we also compare the output of the method
with the ground truth. For calculating ground truth, the documents with top 50 scores in the
dataset are considered as the actual match results, where the complete tf-idf scores of the
documents are used without any encryption. These actual results are then compared with the
results evaluated by the system. The average precision and recall rates in comparison with
the ground truth, for a set of 20 queries with 2 and 3 keywords and λ = 100, are given in
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Figure 12 and 13, respectively. The figures show that, the actual accuracy of the method is
quite promising when the tf-idf scores are considered in calculating the actual results, instead
of the conjunctive (i.e., contain all terms) case.
Figure 12: Average Precision Rate using Ground Truth, λ = 100
Figure 13: Average Recall Rate using Ground Truth, λ = 100
We also measure the effect of λ on accuracy. Figures 14 and 15 show that increase in λ has
a positive effect on both precision and recall. However, increase in λ also linearly increases
search and index generation times as shown in Section 5.1 and improvement in accuracy is
very limited. Hence, an optimum value for λ should be set according to the properties of the
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dataset used, which is set as 100 in our case.
Figure 14: Average Precision Rate for different λ
Figure 15: Average Recall Rate for different λ
5.3 Dataset Update
In Section 4.5, we propose a lazy update scheme that does not update the idf values of the
existing scores at each data set update, but uses the existing scores as an approximation. In
this subsection, we provide the change rate of the idf due to updating in the dataset. We
calculate the average idf value of a dataset of size 400.000 documents while adding new
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set of documents of size 10.000. As Table 3 indicates, the effect of adding new documents is
very low especially if the dataset size is large hence, the lazy update does not reduce accuracy.
# documents 400000 410000 420000 430000
avg idf 2.26678 2.26716 2.26713 2.26717
Table 3: Average IDF values
Inserting index entries for newly added documents first requires calculating the corre-
sponding signatures by a trusted proxy and than updating the encrypted bucket content vec-
tors accordingly. We performed experiments for the updating times for bulk insertions of
1000, 5000 and 10000 documents and the entire updating operations are calculated i 52, 5,
59, 5 and 67 seconds, respectively. This shows that the updating operation should better be
done for large sets of documents, which are also suitable in the big data setting.
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6 Conclusion and Future Work
Cloud computing technologies became more and more popular nowadays. Naturally, many
organizations prefer to outsource their data to the cloud services such as Amazon Elastic
Compute Cloud [16] or Google Cloud Platform [5] to take advantage of their high storage
capacity and computation power and lower IT costs. However, as these companies such
as Amazon or Google have access to the search and access patterns of their customers, the
privacy and security concerns will not be mitigated even if the outsourced data is encrypted.
Furthermore, encryption by itself, hinders the most basic operations over the outsourced data
such as keyword-based search to access the relevant documents without downloading the
entire database. While secure search operation over encrypted data is generally possible
thanks to searchable encryption techniques, speed and accuracy remain always a problem,
especially in big data applications.
In this work, we addressed the problem of applying an existing privacy-preserving search
method for big data. We utilized the private search method by O¨rencik et al. [27] as the un-
derlying technique and adapted it for the Hadoop distributed file system and the MapReduce
programming model. We implemented the entire system and tested it in a three-node Hadoop
cluster with the Enron email data set and demonstrate the effectiveness and scalability of the
system. We also proposed a lazy idf update method that can be used for dynamically changing
large data sets and provided experimental results using a large real data set.
In the light of the promising results, we believe this method will increase the applicability
of privacy preserving search over big data.
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